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ENLIGHTENMENT ECONOMICS AND THE FRAMING
OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
RENÉE LETTOW LERNER*

Did the Framers have an economic theory in mind when they
wrote and ratified the U.S. Constitution? Some say the principal
Framers did not have a common, cohesive set of views on eco‐
nomics.1 Others consider the question to be irrelevant. Society
and constitutional interpretation have moved on, these commen‐
tators argue, so what the Framers thought or whether they em‐
bedded economic views in the Constitution has about as much
relevance today as a typewriter. Another possible position is that
the Framers might have had common understandings about
economics but largely left them out of the Constitution, except in
odd bits like the Contracts Clause or the Takings Clause.
The principal Framers did, in fact, share a basic set of eco‐
nomic views, though they did not agree on all economic ques‐
tions. These economic views permeate the Constitution and
are not manifest only in odd clauses. Many structural features
of the Constitution are designed to further desirable economic
ends, as the Framers envisioned them.
I.

ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

What was the content of the Framers’ economic beliefs, and
where did those beliefs come from? These economic beliefs
were shared throughout Europe in the late eighteenth century,
although events in America helped to reinforce them.
Historians and students of philosophy have long explored
the political thought of the Enlightenment: the contractual
theories of Locke, the checks and balances of Montesquieu, and
* Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law
School. Bradford Clark, Craig Lerner, and Arthur Wilmarth gave helpful
comments and suggestions.
1. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTI‐
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 189–216 (1913) (describing the differing economic
views of the Framers).
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so forth. This political thought, however, went hand in hand
with Enlightenment economic thought.
To understand the Enlightenment economic thought that the
Framers shared with many in Europe, it is necessary to under‐
stand the workings of the old regime. Guilds, monopolies, and
mercantilism characterized that regime. The guilds formed an
elaborate regulatory apparatus. To have a dress made in France,
for example, one had to buy cloth from a draper, get accessories
or ornaments from the mercer, and bring it all to a tailor, who
then set to work according to the rules established by his guild
for cutting cloth.2 The tailor was forbidden to stock or sell cloth.3
If these practices resemble union work rules today, that is not an
accident. Governments sold monopolies, or patents as they were
known, on the manufacture, exportation, or importation of coal,
soap, starch, iron, leather, books, wine, and fruit—in short, on
almost everything imaginable—to raise revenue.4 Colonial
Americans resented English mercantilism in the form of the
Navigation Acts, which required colonists to export certain
goods only to England or its colonies and to conduct their trade
entirely on English or colonial vessels.5
These old‐regime economic ideas dominated thought and pol‐
icy throughout Europe in the first half of the eighteenth century.
Commerce was viewed as a “kind of warfare”6; mercantilism
was widespread. Gradually, in the second half of the eighteenth
century, different economic ideas took hold. Thinkers praised
free trade as leading to economic growth for all participants;
trade was seen less and less as a zero‐sum game. Rent‐seeking
(the transfer of wealth from producers to non‐producers through
political power) and monopolies came under increasing attack.
Most prominent among Enlightenment economists was Adam
Smith at the University of Edinburgh. Smith’s arguments in fa‐
2. PHILIPPE PERROT, FASHIONING THE BOURGEOISIE: A HISTORY OF CLOTHING IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY 36 (Richard Bienvenu trans., Princeton Univ. Press
1994) (1981) (describing ancient régime practices for the making and selling of
clothing in the eighteenth century).
3. Id.
4. See P.J. Federico, Origin and Early History of Patents, 11 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 292,
292–95 (1929).
5. See Second Navigation Act, 12 Car. 2, c. 18 (1663) (Eng.).
6. JOEL MOKYR, THE ENLIGHTENED ECONOMY: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF BRIT‐
AIN 1700–1850, at 64 (2009) (quoting Josiah Child, seventeenth‐century mercantil‐
ist and economist).
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vor of free trade are well‐known. In The Wealth of Nations, pub‐
lished in 1776, he called monopolies the “great enemy of good
management.”7 Other thinkers also praised free trade and con‐
demned monopolies, even before publication of The Wealth of
Nations. Montesquieu, in the first edition of the The Spirit of the
Laws, published in 1748, discussed how trade brought prosperity
to all participants and declared: “The natural effect of commerce
is to lead to peace.”8
In Britain, these ideas had political consequences. The old
economic regime was passing away, despite the restrictions on
the colonies. As historian Joel Mokyr puts it, Britain by the
mid‐eighteenth century had “free internal trade, weak guilds, a
relatively effective fiscal system, and a state that was firmly
committed to protection of property.”9 This relative economic
freedom encouraged the gradual improvements in technology
that drove the industrial revolution. In continental countries,
the old economic regime lasted longer. France struggled free
from it in a bloody revolution and aftermath from which it took
decades to recover. Eventually, however, the countries of
Western Europe instituted Enlightenment economic principles
to one degree or another and experienced their own industrial
and agricultural revolutions accordingly.
II.

ENLIGHTENMENT ECONOMICS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

Fortunately for the new Republic, two of the most important
Founders least affected by Adam Smith’s thought were not at
the convention in Philadelphia. John Adams was a Malthusian
pessimist,10 Thomas Jefferson an idealistic agrarian,11 and both
were busy in Europe during the summer of 1787. Benjamin
Franklin, another agrarian, was at Philadelphia but in his do‐
tage. At center stage in the Constitutional Convention were
those who had studied The Wealth of Nations carefully and had
7. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 149 (Kathryn Sutherland ed., Oxford Univ. Press reissue 2008) (1776).
8. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
338 (Ann M. Cohler et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748).
9. MOKYR, supra note 5, at 65.
10. See FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORI‐
GINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 99 (1985).
11. Id. at 106–108 (arguing that agrarian French physiocrats, including François
Quesnay, significantly influenced both Jefferson and Franklin).
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absorbed its principles. These delegates included James Madi‐
son and Alexander Hamilton.12
If the most important Framers in Philadelphia largely shared
the economic views of prominent Enlightenment thinkers such
as Adam Smith and Montesquieu, why do we see so few direct
traces in the Constitution? To be sure, there are the Contracts
Clause13 and the Takings Clause,14 evidence of the importance
to the Framers of upholding contracts and protecting private
property from government interference. Many of the broad
principles of Enlightenment economics, however, such as pro‐
moting free trade and preventing monopolies and rent‐seeking,
would have been difficult to enact directly. One could imagine
a variety of exceptions under different circumstances that
would make it hard to draft a general rule. In the area of pat‐
ents for intellectual property, the Framers actually sanctioned
monopolies in the Constitution itself,15 though not without con‐
troversy. We therefore, for the most part, should not expect to
find direct enactment of these ideas.
Nonetheless, the Framers crafted numerous parts of the Con‐
stitution to further these principles indirectly. I will discuss four
of them here: (1) the Commerce Clause;16 (2) the interstate and
alien diversity clauses;17 (3) the elaborate procedures of bicam‐
eralism and presentment for enacting bills (and the provision
allowing the Senate to amend financial bills);18 and (4) the enu‐
merated limitations on legislative power.19
The clause giving Congress the power to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce was intended to prevent the States from
restricting trade. This purpose can be difficult to remember in
our post‐New Deal era, when the clause is used to justify con‐
gressional regulation of almost every conceivable action, in‐
cluding the growing of marijuana for one’s own consump‐

12. See id. at 128; RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 347, 376–77 (2004);
ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, JAMES MADISON: THE FOUNDING FATHER 54 (1987).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8–9.
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tion.20 Concern that the States would restrict trade was not
merely hypothetical. The States were imposing tolls and tariffs
on each other and attempting to do the same with foreign
commerce, as well as creating monopolies that restricted
trade.21
The case of Gibbons v. Ogden22 perfectly illustrates how the
Commerce Clause was intended to operate. The state of New
York, in unenlightened old‐regime fashion, granted a monop‐
oly on steamship travel in New York waters to two investors.23
Congress had enacted its own, non‐monopoly licensing scheme
governing ships. The Supreme Court invalidated New York’s
monopoly, citing Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause.24 In one blow, the Court, applying the Commerce Clause,
simultaneously struck down one of the most despised features of
the old economic regime—the monopoly—and furthered one of
the Enlightenment economists’ chief goals: free trade.
The interstate and alien diversity clauses concerning federal
jurisdiction in Article III also were based on a desire to increase
trade. The Framers realized that trade could not flourish if out‐
of‐state and foreign merchants suffered from bias against them
in state courts. During the Virginia ratifying convention, in
June 1788, James Madison argued in favor of federal diversity
jurisdiction for this reason: “We well know, Sir, that foreigners
cannot get justice done them in these [state] Courts, and this
has prevented many wealthy Gentlemen from trading or resid‐
ing among us.”25 The same difficulty applied to out‐of‐state
merchants. To this day, a number of businesses fear bias in
state courts, and make litigation and commercial decisions ac‐

20. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 28 (2005) (holding that under the
Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate the growing of marijuana for the
grower’s consumption).
21. See MCDONALD, supra note 10, 102–106.
22. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
23. Id. at 2.
24. Id. at 86.
25. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 38–39 n.187 (2009) (quoting 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1469 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspere J.
Saladino eds., 1993); see also Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1348 n.507 (1996) (noting Madison’s sup‐
port for diversity jurisdiction).
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cordingly.26 The continuing perception of bias in state courts
suggests problems with many limitations on diversity jurisdic‐
tion, including the requirement of complete diversity.27
The Framers also designed the legislative process to further
commerce and to prevent rent‐seeking indirectly. They viewed
faction as one of the greatest dangers to a republic. Madison
defined a faction in Federalist No. 10 as a “number of citizens,
whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole,
who are united and actuated by some common impulse of pas‐
sion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to
the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”28
One form of faction is the modern, rent‐seeking interest group.
In Federalist No. 10, Madison confidently declared that factions
would not easily be able to attain their ends under the Consti‐
tution because of the diversity of interests in a large republic.29
He referred to the difficulty of a faction getting its program
through “the national council.”30 He and his fellow Framers
had carefully designed the federal legislative process as a sys‐
tem of checks and balances to thwart faction. Through bicam‐
eralism and presentment, each chamber could check the other,
and the President could check both.31 The Framers believed
that this elaborate process would help to weed out faction‐
inspired measures that were rent‐seeking.
26. See Jerry Goldman & Kenneth S. Marks, Diversity Jurisdiction and Local Bias: A Pre‐
liminary Empirical Inquiry, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 104 (1980) (“Both survey groups have
acknowledged that fear of local bias enters the calculus of decision in selecting a judi‐
cial forum.”); see also Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases
Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 408–409 (1992)
(“The bases of client‐related bias that defense counsel reported to be the most common
were out‐of‐state status (50.7%) and business/corporation status (44.8%).”).
27. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806); see also Tammy A.
Sarver, Resolution of Bias: Tort Diversity Cases in the United States Courts of Appeals,
28 JUST. SYS. J. 183, 194 (2007) (“The finding that federal court judges do not tend
to favor non‐diverse (in‐state) litigants over the diverse party suggests that the
prerogative of invoking diversity jurisdiction goes a considerable way to elimi‐
nate the potential for state court bias, real or perceived.”).
28. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
29. See id. at 83–84; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 28, at 323 (James
Madison).
30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 16, supra note 28, at 115 (Alexander Hamilton).
31. See Michael Rappaport, The President’s Veto and the Constitution, 87 NW. U. L.
REV. 735, 742 n.16 (1993) (citing 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 86 (1937)
and JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
385–86 (1987 edition) (original year)).
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The Framers also were alert to the dangers of “tacking.”
Tacking is a procedure in which an unrelated measure is
“tacked” to, for example, an appropriations bill to encourage
legislators who would not otherwise vote for either measure to
do so. Tacking can be a form of logrolling. The members of the
Philadelphia convention discussed the problem of legislative
tacking in detail at several different points.32 The convention
concluded that the President’s veto and each chamber’s power
to amend the other’s bills to strip out extraneous provisions
were sufficient safeguards against tacking. This is why Article
I, Section 7, which sets out the House’s power to originate bills
for raising revenue, carefully preserves the Senate’s power to
amend those bills.33 This analysis has interesting implications
for reconciliation procedure, earmarks, and other notable fea‐
tures of the legislative process today.
Finally, the Framers intended the enumerated powers of Con‐
gress to limit the subjects the national legislature could address.
This limitation served not only to preserve powers in the States,
but also to control the possibilities for national rent‐seeking and
congressional interference in the economy. An exchange be‐
tween Nancy Pelosi and a CNSNews.com reporter in October
2009 illustrates the modern fate of the idea of enumerated pow‐
ers in Congress:
CNSNews.com: “Madam Speaker, where specifically does
the Constitution grant Congress the authority to enact an
individual health insurance mandate?”
Mrs. Pelosi: “Are you serious? Are you serious?”
CNSNews.com: “Yes, yes I am.” 34

Mrs. Pelosi then shook her head before taking a question from
another reporter.35 Her press spokesman later clarified the
Speaker’s meaning: “You can put this on the record. That is not

32. Rappaport, supra note 31, at 746 n.33–34 (citing 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 233, 263, 273, 275–76, 545–46 (1966)).
33. U.S. CONST. art I, § 7. “[B]ut the Senate may propose or concur with
Amendments as on other Bills.” Id.
34. Matt Cover, When Asked Where the Constitution Authorizes Congress to Order
Americans to Buy Health Insurance, Pelosi Says: “Are You Serious?”, CNSNEWS.COM
(Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.cnsnews.com/node/55971.
35. Id.

8

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 35

a serious question. That is not a serious question.”36 There is a
stylistic similarity between Mrs. Pelosi and her spokesman.
Alas, terse repetitions do not substitute for reasoned debate
about constitutionality of the sort that used to go on regularly
in both chambers of Congress and that fill up pages of the old
Congressional Record.37
Legislators are not the only officials with a lax sense of their
constitutional responsibilities. Recent presidents have failed to
exercise their veto power as earlier ones did, instead contenting
themselves with issuing signing statements that object to the con‐
stitutionality of particular provisions. Past presidents vetoed bills
containing provisions they deemed unconstitutional, including,
occasionally, bills they otherwise thought good policy. President
Washington explained that his first veto was based on constitu‐
tional grounds38 and his successors through Andrew Jackson
similarly explained the vast majority of their vetoes.39 In vetoing
the Internal Improvements Bill in 1817, President Madison deliv‐
ered a message that included the following:
I am not unaware of the great importance of roads and ca‐
nals and the improved navigation of water courses, and that
a power in the National Legislature to provide for them
might be exercised with signal advantage to the general
prosperity. But seeing that such a power is not expressly
given by the Constitution, and believing that it can not be
deduced from any part of it without an inadmissible latitude
of construction and a reliance on insufficient precedents; be‐
lieving also that the permanent success of the Constitution
36. Id.
37. On November 14, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to con‐
sider several questions relating to the constitutionality of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111‐148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111‐152,
124 Stat. 109 (2010). See Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. HHS, 648 F.3d 1235, 1241 (11th
Cir. 2011) cert. granted, 11‐393, 2011 WL 5515162 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) and cert.
granted, 11‐398, 2011 WL 5515164 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) and cert. granted in part, 11‐
400, 2011 WL 5515165 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011). The Eleventh Circuit held that the
Act’s individual mandate to buy health insurance was unconstitutional; the Sixth
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit held that it was within Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause. See id.; see also Seven‐Sky v. Holder, No. 11‐5047, 2011 WL
5378319 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 2011); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529,
534 (6th Cir. 2011).
38. See ROBERT SPITZER, THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO 27–28 (1988).
39. See EDWARD CAMPBELL MASON, THE VETO POWER: ITS ORIGIN, DEVELOP‐
MENT AND FUNCTION IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 129 (Albert
Bushnell Hart ed., 1890).
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depends on a definite partition of powers between the Gen‐
eral and the State Governments, and that no adequate land‐
marks would be left by the constructive extension of the
powers of Congress as proposed in the bill, I have no option
but to withhold my signature from it.40

There are recent glimmers that some citizens and officials are
paying more attention to the enumerated powers set out in the
Constitution. In each Congress since the 104th (January 1995 to
January 1997), a bill known as the Enumerated Powers Act has
been introduced in the House of Representatives. The bill would
require that every bill specify the constitutional provision giving
Congress the power to enact it.41 At the beginning of the 112th
Congress, in January 2011, the House adopted a new part of a
House Rule requiring the sponsor of a bill or resolution to sub‐
mit a statement “citing as specifically as practicable the power or
powers under the Constitution authorizing the enactment of that
bill or joint resolution.”42 The new House leadership organized
briefings for House staff and circulated a memo to members on
how to comply with the new requirement.43
If the enumerated powers set out in the Constitution are
thought to be too restrictive, the proper solution is to amend
the Constitution, not to distort certain provisions beyond rec‐
ognition. Although amendments to the Constitution have be‐
come very rare, in earlier times—when judges and other offi‐
cials and citizens took the language of the Constitution more
seriously—amendments were more frequent.44 They might be‐
40. James Madison, Veto Message on the Internal Improvements Bill (Mar. 3,
1817) (transcript available at http://millercenter.org/scripps/archives/speeches/
detail/3630).
41. See John Shadegg, Enumerated Powers Act, JOHN SHADEGG CONGRESS,
http://www.johnshadegg.com/issues/enumerated.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
The Tea Party movement has been calling attention to this proposal. See, e.g., HR
450 Enumerated Powers Act, TEA PARTY NEWS WATCH (Nov. 8, 2009),
http://teapartynewswatch.com/hr‐450‐enumerated‐powers‐act/. See The Enumer‐
ated Powers Act of 2011, H.R. 125, 112th Cong. (2011); see also 157 CONG. REC. 1,
H37 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2011). In January 2011, the House Judiciary Committee re‐
ferred the most recent version of the Enumerated Powers Act to the Subcommittee
on the Constitution. H.R. 125: Enumerated Powers Act, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h112‐125 (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
42. H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (2011) (enacted).
43. See Richard E. Cohen, House GOP: Bills Will Have to Cite Constitution, POLI‐
TICO (Dec. 20, 2010, 10:01 AM), http://politico.com/news/stories/1210/46565.html.
44. See Janice C. May, Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited, 17 PUB‐
LIUS 153, 162–68 (1987).
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come so again. There is nothing radical about the idea of a con‐
stitutional amendment to give Congress the power to regulate
environmental pollution, for example. Such an amendment
might well garner the necessary political support to be ratified.
If constitutional language is not taken seriously and regu‐
larly amended, a dangerous vision of the Constitution arises:
the constitutional text as a fossil, an outdated relic that must
have life breathed into it by “creative” interpretations. This is
the current notion of a “living Constitution.” This vision invites
much mischief. Among other things, Congress sinks into
sloppy practices leading to economic favoritism and massive
intrusions into the economy, the President becomes a party to
these practices and fails to protect the common good of the en‐
tire nation, and judges—particularly Supreme Court justices—
alternately ignore their proper constitutional responsibilities
and award enormous political power to themselves to act like
unelected and unreviewable legislators. Of course the Constitu‐
tion should be “living,” in the sense of having meaning rele‐
vant to current activities. Few would want an irrelevant Consti‐
tution. The question is “living” by what means?
The Framers designed the Constitution to further certain core
principles of Enlightenment economic thought: protecting pri‐
vate property, enforcing contracts, preventing monopolies, and
encouraging free trade among states and nations. In some
clauses these principles are explicit.45 In others, the Framers allo‐
cated powers and arranged procedures to further these princi‐
ples indirectly. Interpreting these clauses according to their ani‐
mating economic principles enriches our understanding of
constitutional meaning and guards against judges’ fancies or
political fads. Such interpretation might well be more practicable
than some think and might have the added benefit of salutary
economic effects. Just as deviation from this animating under‐
standing occurred in different branches of government and the
electorate over time, a return to this understanding might re‐
quire broad encouragement. Support and, indeed, virtue among
legislators, government officers, judges, and ultimately, voters
are important to maintain the economic principles the Founders
sought to encourage through the framing of the Constitution.

45. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (Takings Clause).

